“An equally important component of this multi-layered approach was Sandinista-aligned social movements of trade unionists, peasants, students, and community organisations.”
By Helen Yuill
Between 1979 and 1990, the FSLN transitioned from a guerrilla movement to a revolutionary government to an opposition party, a unique trajectory for any political party.
When the FSLN lost elections in 1990, they committed to a peaceful handover of power, and in 1992 developed a strategy for ‘governing from below’ to position the party for a return to government
As a country in the ‘backyard’ of the US that has suffered more than 100 years of interventions, how did the FSLN not only survive but organise to return to power in the 2006 elections?
The shock 1990 defeat of the Sandinistas was the result of the US ‘contra’ war that had cost 30,000 lives and an economic blockade that left the country in a state of collapse.
The US had failed to oust the Sandinistas by military and economic means, so moved to the electoral front by directing and funding a coalition of 15 parties called UNO.
The elections were technically free and fair but voters went to the polls with a gun to their heads: vote for the FSLN and the war and the blockade will continue, vote for UNO and the war will end, the US will lift the blockade, and dollars will flow from the North. Faced with such a stark choice, a deeply traumatised electorate made a pragmatic choice and voted for UNO.
But crucial to the FSLN strategy of ‘governing from below’ was the fact that losing elections did not mean losing the Revolution.
So what were the political forces that came together to achieve this? From 1990 to 2006, the FSLN held an average of one third of the seats in the National Assembly and a similar percentage of local councils, especially in Sandinista strongholds. In the 2021 elections, the FSLN took control of the majority of councils, including Managua.
An equally important component of this multi-layered approach was Sandinista-aligned social movements of trade unionists, peasants, students, and community organisations.
The strategy was to combine popular struggle in defence of the Revolution’s gains, political struggle within the nation’s institutions, and electoral struggle as the path to retaking political power.
The immediate task was to negotiate a handover of power respecting the wishes of an electorate who had voted for peace and stability.
UNO and the FSLN signed a Transition Protocol: demobilisation of US-backed “contras”, continuation of the Police and the Army as the country’s armed forces, and respect for property granted to marginalised sectors of the population.
FSLN leader Daniel Ortega warned of the enormity of the task: ‘It was a battle that would not be easy; we faced an entrenched power that held a majority in the National Assembly and controlled an Executive Branch with the authority to make decisions and order repression – all backed up by the US’.
After the transition, a series of US-backed neoliberal governments brought some level of economic stability but at enormous social cost.
UNO at the behest of the IMF implemented structural adjustment programmes: economic liberalisa-tion, minimising the role of the state, privatising state – owned companies and implementing large scale cutbacks in public expenditure.
Over 60% of state sector workers lost their jobs, including 2,500 union leaders. Unemployment and underemployment soared to 70%. Small and medium-sized enterprises closed because they could not compete with the flood of imports.
Health care and education were semi-privatised in line with IMF dogma. Over a million children had no access to schooling; health care for the impoverished majority meant that ‘public hospitals were places where you went to die…unless your family could afford to save you.’ Becca Renk, coordinadora, Casa Ben Lnder.
A period of ‘governing from below’ through Sandinismo mobilised to defend the gains of the Revolution: protests in the streets, in the countryside, and in factories, backed up by FSLN deputies in the National Assembly and in local councils – all with support from the FSLN leadership and grassroots cadre.
Heading these movements was the National Workers Front (FNT), formed of health, public service, and agricultural workers and students. Strikes and protests took place defending workers’ rights, denouncing privatisation of state-owned property and seizures of land from peasant farmers, and calliing for the right to free higher education.
“…we stood our ground…. defending workers’ rights, ensuring that some properties were allocated to rural workers, and certain enterprises to urban workers‘.. if privatization is going to take place, then privatise in favour of the workers who have spent their blood and sweat building and maintain-ing them in times of war.’ Daniel Ortega
Social movements and NGOs addressed the basic needs of those abandoned by the State. This led to an archipelago of organisations mainly in or near cities but leaving the rest of the country, particularly the Caribbean Coast, abandoned. From 1992, the US Agency for International Development (USAID) began to promote and fund NGOs.
The victory of the FSLN in the 2006 elections was the direct result of their strategy, resilience, courage and determination through 16 very complex years of ‘governing from below.’
This is the second stage of the Sandinista Revolution, the first stage having been thwarted by war and economic collapse. Through well-integrated national development plans addressing the root causes of poverty, the Sandinista government has succeeded in cutting poverty from 54% to 29%.
This has been achieved despite US sanctions, the COVID pandemic, an attempted coup, and two major hurricanes.
- Helen Yuill is a co-ordinator for the Nicaragua Solidarity Campaign Action Group (NSCAG).
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left ally with Nicaragua trade unionists, FMLN and PT PT and Cuban
representatives.
