“So long as UK-made components continue to power the jets that level buildings and kill civilians, the charge of complicity remains unshakeable.”
In recent months, growing concern has emerged within the UK’s legal and diplomatic communities over Britain’s role in the ongoing war in Gaza. In an unprecedented intervention, over 800 judges, lawyers and legal academics wrote to the Prime Minister stating: “Genocide is being perpetrated in Gaza or, at a minimum, there is a serious risk of genocide occurring.” Their warning was echoed by more than 300 civil servants at the Foreign Office, who raised concerns about potential UK “complicity” in Israel’s military actions.
Parliamentary attention has followed. In early 2025, former Labour leader Jeremy Corbyn introduced the Gaza (Independent Public Inquiry) Bill, calling for a full public investigation into the UK’s involvement in Israel’s military campaign, including the sale and supply of weapons, surveillance aircraft, and the use of British military facilities—particularly RAF bases in Cyprus, which are known launch points for UK reconnaissance flights over Gaza.
Since the start of Israel’s assault in October 2023, the UK has maintained a close material connection to Israeli military capability. Though the new Labour government, under Foreign Secretary David Lammy, announced in September 2024 the suspension of 30 arms export licences to Israel, this represents only a small portion of the roughly 350 licences previously in place. According to Lammy, the suspended items include components for military aircraft, drones, and ground targeting systems—technologies directly relevant to operations in Gaza.
While this move was presented as a meaningful step towards compliance with international humanitarian law, it has not ended UK involvement. Much of the ongoing debate centres on the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter programme, an international military-industrial collaboration in which the UK plays a central role. The F-35, capable of surveillance, ground targeting, and precision bombing, is used by Israel in its operations in Gaza—including the deployment of SPICE guided munitions and Rampage ground-penetrating bombs.
The UK is the only Tier One partner in the F-35 programme, contributing an estimated 15% of the components in every jet produced. Other manufacturing partner nations include Italy, the Netherlands, Australia, Canada, Denmark, and Norway. These states are represented, along with the US, on the F-35 Joint Executive Steering Board (JESB), the governing body overseeing the programme. While the JESB reportedly meets twice annually, the United States remains the dominant actor in both policy and production decisions.
Israel is not a manufacturing partner in the F-35 programme. It is instead a Foreign Military Sales (FMS) customer, meaning it purchases F-35s through agreements with the US government and is allowed to install its own modifications. Despite its non-partner status, Israel’s access to the aircraft and its components remains uninterrupted—even as accusations of war crimes mount.
In September 2024, while suspending several arms licences, Lammy also confirmed that the UK would not suspend exports related to the global F-35 programme. Doing so, he argued, would “undermine the global F-35 supply chain that is vital for the security of the UK, our allies, and NATO.”
Yet this rationale has drawn increasing criticism in Parliament. MPs have repeatedly asked why the UK cannot suspend supplies of components destined for Israel without disrupting supplies to other F-35 users. Ministers have responded by insisting that all UK-made parts enter a “global supply pool”, which services more than 20 countries. The government has claimed that withdrawing from this pool would effectively mean the UK could no longer operate its own F-35 fleet.
When asked if the UK had raised humanitarian law concerns within the JESB, or sought to assess the feasibility of suspending a specific FMS customer like Israel from the supply pool, ministers offered little clarity. One response merely stated that such conversations were confidential. Another noted that all FMS customers are “managed directly by the US Government”—implying that the UK has neither the will nor the leverage to alter Israel’s access to the system.
This silence speaks volumes. It suggests that the UK government, while publicly distancing itself from some aspects of Israel’s campaign in Gaza, is unwilling to challenge the deeper infrastructure that enables it—namely, the global defence supply chain in which British industry is deeply embedded.
What remains clear is that the UK has the capacity to act. It could, through the JESB or direct negotiation with the United States, propose a suspension of Israel’s access to F-35 parts. But in the face of American political support for Israel, Keir Starmer’s government appears reluctant to even raise the issue.
In doing so, Britain remains part of the machinery that enables Israel’s bombardment of Gaza. Arms licences may have been suspended. Surveillance flights may be explained as intelligence-gathering. But so long as UK-made components continue to power the jets that level buildings and kill civilians, the charge of complicity remains unshakeable.
- Ben Folley writes for Labour Outlook and is on x/twitter and on bsky.
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